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In the legislative and judicial history of our animal
welfare law, four considerations have been variously
identified to explain the existence and form of those laws:
1.
2.
3.
4.

the "Dominion" rationale;
the Kantian thesis;
the intrinsic value of an animal;
human sentiment.

1. The "Dominion" Rationale
Humankind's biblical "dominion" was important
in the early formulation and construction of animal
cruelty legislation.
It has often been suggested that the integration into
Judaeo-Christian theology of Greek philosophy served
to establish that "dominion" as both despotic and
anthropocentric. 2 Nevertheless,legislative and judicial
consideration of the rationale for animal cruelty
legislation during the nineteenth century not infrequently
invoked humankind's biblical "dominion,"3 on occasion
even citing scripture to this effect. 4 That the biblical
basis of humankind's "dominion" falls short of simple
despotism over the animal creation seems to have been
well accepted by both legislature and judiciary
throughout the nineteenth century.
Nevertheless, there remained no unanimity in the
interpretation of what that more humane "dominion"

"The greatness ofa natwn and its moral
progress can be jUdged by the way its animals
are treated"

L

Mahatma Ghandi (1972)

Inspired by the resurgence of interest in the nature
of the relationship between humans and animals dating
to the publication in 1975 of Victorian philosopher Peter
Singer's utilitarian-based book, Animal Liberation,l
there have been significant developments in Australian
animal welfare law within the last ten years. At the
Commonwealth level, the Senate Select Committee on
Animal Welfare was established in 1983, issuing its
most recent report, on Intensive Livestock Production,
in June, 1990. The States of New South Wales, Victoria,
and South Australia have all recently introduced
complete revisions of their animal cruelty legislation,
while Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory
are presently reviewing their existing provisions.
In the context of this ongoing movement in reform of
Australian animal welfare law, the rationale underlying
the existing law needs to be identified to better
understand what is in the push for what ought to be.
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"Responsible dominion," respecting nature but
subject to the supremacy of human interests in seeking
"proportion between the object and the means,"ll has
characterized much of the history of the construction
of the animal cruelty legislation. Nevertheless, it has
not inevitably done so. The English judiciary were more
equivocal than the Irish in invoking theological precepts
to explain the legislation. They were nevertheless
unprepared to conclude of any human interest
(economic or otherwise) that its fulfillment made
"necessary" any consequent animal suffering.
Dehorning cattle, for example, legitimated by the Irish
courts, I 2 was found cruel by the English,13 the element
of commercial profit to the owner being considered
insufficient to justify the practice.
Such a philosophy has surfaced in the history of
legislative l4 and judicial l5 thinking in England. Its
expression has nevertheless remained merely
occasional. On the question of dehorning itself, the
practice, important to the Irish economy, had "for twenty
years ... been entirely disused throughout England."16
In Australia, as in Ireland, the practice was one
important to the economy of a country substantially
dependent on the activities of its rural sector. It was
expressly exempted from the operation of the legislation
in virtually all Australian States (with the exception of
Victoria, the least rural of the States) in the early
twentieth century.17 The history of the Australian animal
cruelty legislation has been to allow that economic
considerations alone have been sufficient to justify
otherwise cruel practices. Occasional indications of a
more enlightened philosophy are today becoming more
clearly articulated, particularly in relation to the rural
community and medical experimentation. IS .
Nevertheless, the rheological justification for human
consideration of the welfare of animals in terms of
humankind's biblical "dominion," not infrequently
invoked legislatively and judicially during the
nineteenth century, has today fallen from favor:

should involve. At one extreme, characterized as
"responsible dominion,"5 humankind should respect the
animal creation, though human interests remain trumping
in any conflict with the welfare of animals. At the other
extreme, humankind is charged with the responsibility
of keeping "God's garden" as His "representative on
earth" allowing of no interference with the animal
creation in giving effect to human interests. 6
Somewhere between these two extremes would we
find the appropriate nature of our relations with
animals. In the history of the animal cruelty laws,
humankind's biblical "dominion" has never been
effected by legislation reflective of a philosophy of
"stewardship" allowing of no interference with the
animal creation in the fulfillment of human interests.
It was as against humankind's "cruel and oppressive
treatment of ... animals" that Lord Erskine invoked
the obligations of our biblical "stewardship" in the
preamble to his unsuccessful Bill for "Preventing
Wanton and Malicious Cruelty to Animals" in 1809.7
In the interpretation of that notion of "cruelty," the
animal cruelty laws have inevitably employed the
concept of "unnecessary" suffering. This has
legitimated the fulfillment of human interests where
. such would nevertheless cause suffering to animals
provided only that that suffering be "necessary" within
the meaning of the legislation.
The courts, in invoking humankind's biblical
"stewardship" to explain the legislation during the
nineteenth century, were never able to adopt a
construction of the legislation that it could not bear,
i.e., that allowed of no interference with the animal
creation in the expression of human interests. Rather,
it being clear that "necessary" interference was
expressly contemplated by the legislation, the courts
sought to define the content of that "stewardship"
somewhere further along the spectrum toward
"responsible dominion."
While agreed that a "line must be drawn somewhere,"s the courts disagreed about where it should be
drawn. The religious influence was strongest amongst
the Irish judiciary. Nevertheless, it was the Irish
judiciary who construed the legislation as effecting
merely a "responsible dominion." Human interests were
perceived as inevitably trumping the welfare of animals.
While "the lower animals are not to be entirely
subordinated to man"9 they are nevertheless to serve
human interests in effecting "the objects for which cattle
were given to man."lO
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"In Australia little or no debate has occurred
as to the relationship between religion and the
animal liberation movemem."19
It is not within the realm of theology that the current
debates are taking place, nor have they done so during
the course of the twentieth century. Such debates,
apparent in the early history of the animal cruelty
legislation, have appeared in neither legislative nor
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Since "the dog cannot judge:'26 animals being "nonrational [have] only a relative value as means and are
consequent!y called things."27 Kant's consideration of
the value of animals is instrumental. To them "we have
no direct duties."28 On what basis might we nevertheless
have indirect duties toward animals? It is this question
which leads Kant to the formulation of his escalation
thesis: We must "practice kindness toward animals,
for he who is cruel to animals becomes hard in his
dealings with men .... Tender feelings towards dumb
animals develop human feelings towards mankind."29
There is empirical evidence supporting the validity
of this escalation thesis. Studies have suggested that
"childhood cruelty towards animals may operate as one
component of a behavioural spectrum associated with
violence and criminality in adolescence and adulthood."3o In combination with persistent enuresis and
firesetting, "animal cruelty appears to be part of a triad
in childhood which may be associated with dangerous
aggression against others at a later age.,,31 Moreover,
research has suggested a human "tendency to evaluate
others in light of their interactions with animals,"32
further supporting in a more general sense the thesis
that our attitudes toward animals are important in
shaping our attitudes toward one another. 33
Using the escalation thesis to explain the existence
of animal cruelty legislation has an obvious appeal to
those opposed to the notion of the "moral rights" of
animals. It delimits its justification to the realm of
merely instrumental considerations toward animals.
The dilemma with this obvious appeal to explain
the existence of animal cruelty legislation was early
exposed by Joseph Ritson, who noted that "those
accustom'd to eat the brute, should not long abstain
from the man. "34 If we are to learn from our treatment
of animals how we should treat people, animal cruelty
legislation embodying the differential classification
of animals according only to the economic viability
of that protection must imply that we may treat
people similarly.
The implications for our legal system of such a thesis
are clearly unacceptable. It would allow that people
might be treated merely as objects of our property law
system. There are already elements ofsuch a philosophy
in our legal system. The services of professional athletes
(especially football stars) are regularly sold by their
proprietors. Professional baseball plays in the United
States (like indentured servants and serfs) had until
recently no choice in the sale-the reserve clause of

judicial considerations for nearly a century. It appears
to have neither legislatively nor judicially any
perceived role in the further reform of Australian
animal "entity" law. 2o

2. The Kantian Thesis
It is to Kant's "escalation" thesis-that cruelty to
animals brutalizes humans in their attitudes toward
one another-that legislative and judicial consideration
of the rationale for animal cruelty legislation has for
the most part fallen. Although the "demoralization of
the people" appears in the preamble to the English
legislation only in 1835,21 the "evident tendency [in
cruelty] to harden the heart against the natural feelings
of humanity" had figured, in conjunction with the
"dominion" rationale, as early as 1809 in Lord
Erskine's unsuccessful Bill for "preventing Wanton
and Malicious Cruelty to Animals."22 Popular in
judicial analyses of the legislation during the
nineteenth century, but with equivocal support in
Australian courts in the twentieth, this rationale has
continued to appear in judicial analyses in the United
States even in recent years. 23 Embodied in the
"doctrine of moral improvement" it has also
characterized the development of the charitable animal
welfare trust during the twentieth century, receiving
expression most recently in Canada. 24
Background LO Kant's Escalation Thesis

Kant, the German philosopher of the Enlightenment,
had articulated this thesis in following a tradition begun
in Greek moral thought and later brought within the
purview of Western moral thinking by Aquinas. He
had been led to this thesis in his analysis of rationality
as the single most important, morally relevant
characteristic.
"Rationality" he locates in the capacity for moral
legislation. That capacity is an end in itself, to be pursued
through the autonomous act of the individual will. It is
our function to be rational in all aspects of our lives in
respecting rationality as an end and not merely as a
means to an end. Since humans are the only rational
beings, this leads Kant to his "Categorical Imperative,"
or basic moral law, that you should "[a]ct in such a way
that you always treat humanity, whether in your own
person or the person of any other, never simply as a
means, but always at the same time as an end."25
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their contracts enabling their proprietors unfettered
freedom in the sale of their services. 35
The differen tial treatment of animals under
legislation has unpalatable implications quite separate
from its potential for escalation to the economic
treatment of human beings. Canadian neurosurgeons
who had involved themselves in animal experimentation
during a year's sabbatical were reported to have taken
quite some time to regain empathy with their patients'
suffering when they returned to doctoring. 36
Using the escalation thesis to explain our existing
animal cruelty legislation clearly has implications
detrimental to the public benefit. Although formulated
in terms of the "doctrine of moral improvement" in the
law of charity, it nevertheless finds no support there
either, human welfare, unlike that of animals, having
of itself never been considered charitableY The
community's morals it seems are not thought by the
courts to be elevated in the same way by diminishing
cruelty to humans as by diminishing cruelty to animals.
Nor does it have any appeal in considering the nature
of the noncharitable purpose trust for a particular
animal. Under a variant of the "escalation thesis," such
trusts might be thought to survive on the basis of the
public benefit in encouraging kindly action toward
animals. Yet it is the absence of public benefit that
prevents such trusts being held to be charitable. That
such trusts are not struck down by the courts cannot find
its justification in any variant of the escalation thesis.
While popular in legislative and judicial thinking
and supported by empirical evidence as to its validity,
Kant's escalation thesis, as an explanation of the
rationale underlying animal "entity" law in Australia,
is substantially inadequate. If applied in the context of
our existing animal cruelty legislation, it brings with it
unpalatable implications for our community, and in
respect of the law as to wills and trusts it cannot be
applied in any way that forms a coherent explanation
of the present form of that law.

protected."38 The legislation was seen as an attempt to
"recognize and ... protect some abstract rights in all
that animate creation made subject to man."39 Even in
recent years, courts in the United States have apparently
referred to the "moral rights" of animals as, for example,
in a Memorandum Opinion and Order issued in the
General Sessions Court at Kingsport. Tennessee, in
198340 and in Caper's Estate (1964)41 actually quoting
a passage from Albert Schweitzer's Out of My Life
and Thought on the ethics of a concern for the sacred
nature of life.
In the United States there is also recent legislative
support for this view, the California Senate resolving
in 1979 that "the Legislature of the State of California
should take effective measures to protect and defend
the rights of animals. ''42

3. Intrinsic Value

The intrinsic value of an animal, recognized in these
occasional ascriptions of "moral rights" in the United
States, also appears to be recognized in the nature of
the most recent movements in reform of Australian
animal welfare law. The Report by the Senate Select
Committee on Animal Welfare: Animal Experimentation 1989 concludes, having devoted nearly twenty
pages of its report to the consideration of the moral
status of animals, that:

There is some judicial support for the view that the
existing animal welfare law recognizes the intrinsic
value of an animal. Courts in the United States in the
latter part of the nineteenth century on occasion found
in the existence of animal cruelty legislation "the theory,
unknown to the common law, that animals have rights
which, like those of human beings, are to be
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to consider the animal's "welfare as an essential
factor,"55 providing, for example, confinement of the
animals by means that "ensure [its] comfort and wellbeing," taking into account such factors as its natural
environmental and behavioural requirements. 56
Such refonns are also evident internationally, the
Animal Protection Act (1988: 534) (Sweden), for
example, seeking to ensure that both urban and rural
domestic animals are provided with environments that
"allow the animals to behave naturally.,,57
These recent revisions of the law recognize the need
to make technology meet the needs ofthe animal rather
than the reverse. In doing so, they appear to give
legislative force to the theories of those who would
advocate the intrinsic value of the animal's well-being. 58
The most satisfactorily articulated of these is Bernard
Rollin's use of the telos of a being, as identifying the
characteristic giving rise to the possession of "moral
rights." By it, animals are not measured "according to
scales that compare them to human beings.',59 Rather,
it advocates, as the most recent legislative reforms
appear to do, that we should recognize their own
biologically determined natures in determining the
morality of our treatment of them.
Of course, these legislative reforms, protecting
animals in terms of their own natural needs, might
well be explained on purely instrumental grounds. For
example, the recognition of their natural needs may
make us more likely to recognize the needs of members
of our own communities. However instrumentally
justified though, this type of reform is an answer to
the unpalatable consequences identified in the
application of Kant's escalation thesis to the more
traditional form of animal cruelty legislation and is,
in any event, consistent with the type of reform
advocated by many of those philosophers who have
sought the moral consideration of animals for their
own sakes. On the other hand, this legislation may
well be construed as a far-sighted attempt to recognize
the natural needs of animals as morally considerable
in their own right and in the absence of purely
instrumental considerations.
The natural needs of animals have been the focus of
little attention historically in either the drafting or
subsequent judicial construction of our animal welfare
laws. While animal cruelty legislation has on occasion
acknowledged "the duty of every person having the care
or charge of any animal to take all reasonable steps to
ensure [its] well-being,"60 the recognition of that duty

Through animal cruelty ... legislation, society
has acknowledged that animals ... have certain
claims or interests which may be expressed as
rights, that are afforded protection. When
rights of animals come into conflict with
those of humans, the rights of one will
normally succumb to the other. Although
humans rights have usually predominated in
such conflicts, each case should be examined
on its merits and human rights should not
automatically prevai1. 43
The Report merely evidences "changing community
attitudes towards animals"44 in Australia with "an
increase in the demonstrable concern for all living
beings."45 That change, under which a moralistic
outlook on animals is now as popularly held as the
previously predominant utilitarian perspective,46 has
seen a British public opinion poll in recent years suggest
that 9% of the population would even be prepared to
change their voting habits on the issue of animal
welfare.47 Despite a limited moralistic and pronounced
utilitarian outlook toward animals amongst the rural
community generally,48 a 1981 survey of Australian
farmers revealed that 87% in fact "recognized that cases
of cruelty and mistreatment of animals are still
widespread in agriculture. "49
This change in attitude appears to be evident in
recent legislative reform of Australian animal welfare
law. One purpose of the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals Act 1986 (Vict.) is expressed as the prevention
of cruelty to animals, without qualification as to an
instrumental basis for the object.50 While equivocal
therefore as to the implications of this expressed
objective, the legislation itself lends support to an
intrinsic analysis. By that legislation, farmingpractices
are required to comply with relevant Codes of
Practice. 51 Although challenged as failing to recognize
the fundamental economic importance of the rural
community to the State,52 the legislation was passed.
Regulations introduced in that same year under the
South Australian legislation prescribed various Codes
of Practice to operate within the rural sector, recognizing
as the "basic requirement for the welfare of' animals
"a husbandry system appropriate to their psychological
and behavioural needs."53
In similar terms, the most recent revision of the
Australian Code of Practice for the Care and Use of
Animalsfor Scientific Purposes 54 imposes the obligation
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the context of companion animals, its operation more
broadly being highly questionable.
Nevertheless, the theory that moral status should
arise in the context of domestication has been advocated
in justification of reform of the existing law. Its
proponents would not, for example, see in its tenns
justification for the general exemption of "accepted
farming practices" from the operation of the animal
cruelty laws, a position which has historically
characterized the legislation of the Australian States.
Nor does it explain the position of experimental
animals within the legislation, historically granted
limited protections while completely dependent as a
result of domestication.

has been dependent upon the ambit attributed to
"necessity" in the construction of the animal suffering
permitted by the legislation.

Dependency from Domestication
A theory, although advanced in advocation of
reform, which serves well in explaining the established
form of the animal "entity" laws is that which grounds
the intrinsic value of animals in their dependency from
domestication. 61
Whether animals have been domesticated as pets,
servants, sources of food and clothing, or as human
surrogates in experimental research, their social need
to belong to a group has remained a fundamental
biological imperative.62 We have simply shifted that
bond of social dependence to the animal's owner. It is
"[t]hrough this exploitation of the animal's own drive
to belong [that] there emerges a relationship with the
proprietor that is qualitatively different from the mere
owner-owned relationship."63
Having been "brought directly into the human social
unit," it has been suggested that we "would seem to
have no alternative but to treat it as a functioning
. member of that social unit,"64 to be ascribed rights in
the same manner as in the case of "marginal humans."
In both instances the recipient of those rights is a
powerless member of our community whose interests
are to be protected against the exploitation of the more
powerful. The view that domestication is a morally
relevant factor in conferring moral standing on animals
has been considered to be "sufficiently persuasive to
be worth more investigation."65
Such a theory might rationalize even the existing
law in terms of the intrinsic value of animals. If wild,
there being no acquired moral status from domestication,
the animal has no "moral rights" whatever protections
may be instrumentally justified. 66 Its case for moral
consideration is the stronger the greater its dependency
from the fact of its domestication. While wild animals
benefit from merely negative obligations of
noninterference under the animal cruelty legislation,
affirmative obligations toward their animals are
additionally imposed on the owners of domesticated
animals. Those obligations are greater in the case of
companion animals, most dependent on their owners
for their welfare, then in the case of merely rurally
domesticated animals. The recognition of the
noncharitable purpose trust has similarly arisen only in
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4. Human Sentiment
While the most recent reforms in Australian
animal welfare law may be suggestive of a recognition of intrinsic value as inhering in animals,
carrying with it "moral rights" to the recognition of
biologically determined natural needs, no similar
account seems adequate to explain the traditional
form of our animal "entity" laws. In explanation of
their underlying rationale, instrumental rather than
intrinsic considerations seem evident. Nevertheless,
we have identified no clearly authoritative account of
that instrumental explanation.
In humankind's affections for animals, Aquinas
identified either reason or sentiment at their base.67
Reason. expressed in the Kantian escalation thesis,68
has failed to explain our legal expression of those
affections. While contemporary moral philosophy
strongly favors rationalistic theories, sentiment· has
figured prominently in the judicial analyses of animal
cruelty and wills and trusts laws.
Sentiment has appeared in courts in Scotland, the
United States, and South Africa in the analysis of animal
cruelty legislation. 69 In courts in both Australia and
England, it has been mooted in explanation of the
anomalous recognition of the noncharitable purpose
trust,70 and in the United States sentiment has featured
in the judicial construction accorded both testamentary
pet destruction provisions7l and in the award of damages
for wrongful destruction of an animal. 72 When in Smith
v Avanzino73 more than 3000 letters were received by
the court in expressing a "well-defined and universal
sentiment"74 that the public looked with "disfavour ...
[upon] the decree that the decedent had for her dog,"75
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more prevalent in urban environments than the
utilitarian attitude, partiCUlarly in recent years. 83 A
study in the United States suggests that two-thirds of
the American population have owned pets "as dear to
them as another person."84 In rural environments, on
the other hand, where the human/companion animal
bond does not characterize the attitudes of owners
toward their stock, farmers are still highly utilitarian
in their outlook on animals. 8s
Sentimental affections toward animals have
achieved a prominence in current community attitudes
toward animals. They are both sufficient to explain the
existing form of animal "entity" law and are not
infrequently advanced by the courts to explain its
underlying rationale. What place have such sentimental
affections in our moral system?
Sentimentalism has recently been described as
having "no very clear shared sense either in current
moral theory or in the history of ethics."86 Appeals to
sentiment have often been avoided by philosophers in
the animal welfare debate, fearing criticism of their
writing as purely emotive and not worthy of serious
consideration.87
Nevertheless, in recent philosophical writings
(particularly in the context of the animal welfare debate)
there has been a resurgence of interest in the place of
sentiment in a moral system. 88 Discussion of the subject
has centered on the writings of such as Shaftesbury,
Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith. Each sought to anchor
moral motivation and justification not in reason but in
an appeal to emotions, desires, and sentiments.
One difficulty in interpreting their writings derives
from variation in the meaning to be attributed to
terminologies they used. In their use of "sympathy,"
for example, neither Hume nor Smith employed the term
in its generally accepted modem sense, our feeling of
compassion or pity for the suffering of another. 89 For
Hume, it is more than the mere sense of "compassion"
or "pity," being closer in meaning to empathy, actually
understanding the feelings of another whatever be our
own feelings in the matter. 90 It is a matter of shared
feelings, a sense of feeling with another.
In Smith's writings, not even this accurately
characterizes his use of "sympathy." He argues that
more must be involved than merely the emotionally
neutral reception of that other's feelings, for otherwise
there could never then be an absence of sympathy upon
which to base judgments of disapproval. Rather, my
sympathies derive from an enlivening association of

a special statute was even enacted, rushed through the
California legislature in order to save the dog's life. 76
Sentiment has the merit of providing a coherent
explanation of the form of the existing animal "entity"
laws. The differential protection of animals embodied
in the legislation appears to be directly proportionate
to the strength of the human/companion animal bond.
Those animals that perform a companion role as human
pelS and with which we form our closest emotional
attachments are those which have received the most
extensive protection under animal cruelty legislation.
Specific exemptions have operated in relation to our
activities with respect to food and research animals, our
relations with these animals not being characterized by
the same personal and familial ties that characterize the
human/companion animal bond and for whom no
clearly defined public sentiment analogous to that
arising from that bond exists. The philosophy
underlying our animal "entity" laws appears best
described as based merely on human sentiment, laws
"intended ... to save ... people of common good feeling,
the pain of witnessing [animal] sufferings."77
A justification of such laws based on human
sensibilities, while adequate to explain the French "Loi
Grammont," has been argued to be inadequate to explain
the prevention of even private and unobserved cruelty
to an animal under our own legislation. 78 However,
one's sensibilities are perhaps no less offended by the
knowledge of the occurrence of such private activities
then they are by the witnessing of them. Professor Louis
Schwartz, one of the architects of the United States
Model Penal Code, has identified sentiment as the
rationale behind the legislation:
Our concern is for the feelings of other human
beings, a large proportion of whom, although
accustomed to the slaughter of animals for
food, readily identify themselves with a
tortured dog or horse and respond with great
sensitivity to its sufferings.79
While a utilitarian attitude of valuing animals in
terms merely of their practical and material value has
characterized twentieth century perceptions of
animals,8o the humanistic perspective of a strong
affection for animals has become predominant in more
recent years. The most common attitude toward
animals among children 81 and young adults 82 is a
humanistic perception of animals that has become far
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perceived in animal cruelty legislation its usefulness in
"elevating humanity by enlargement of its sympathy
with all God's creatures."l02
In what degree our sentiments are legitimately
motivated by our sentimental concern for the welfare
of animals has been the subject of recent philosophical
writings. The American philosopher, Steve Sapontzis,
has acknowledged the argument (in responding to it)
that in community life, "[w]e are not only permitted
but even obligated to give priority to the interests of
our families, friends, colleagues and compatriots ... a
world from which these non-egalitarian commitments
were abolished would not be enhanced but be
impoverished."l03 On this view, "speciesist tendencies
... are [actually] consequences ... of moral excellence.
The fact that we can find no reason for speciesism
when we consider the consequences, or the morally
relevant characteristics of animal vis-a-vis some
humans, is irrelevant."l04
In responding to this claim, Sapontzis notes that "in
addition to relational rights and responsibilities,
common morality also contains egalitarian rights and
responsibilities."105 Our legal system is cautious in the
delimitation of the moral boundary between legitimate
nepotism and simple prejudice. Racial and sex
discrimination legislation is perhaps the most obvious
example of the requirement of equal consideration of
interests in our society.
Moreover, these boundaries are not drawn along
lines requiring the reciprocation of the rights accorded,
since they are clearly directed to the protection of the
"powerless" in their dealings with the "powerful."lll6
Therequiremem of disclosure by the potentially insured
to the insurer of all material facts lO7 is an illustration
from the law of contract of a right possessed by one
party to a contract to protect its weaker interests against
those of the more powerful party.108
Animals, if, at least in some measure, properly the
objects of our sentimental concerns, are similarly
powerless members of our community whose interests
should be protected against the exploitation of the more
powerful. It is in our capacity to "imaginatively
sympathize"l09 with their position that Smith would
make this moral judgment.
The extent of that protection from exploitation
though is logically dependent on the extent to which
our sympathies exist. Smith himself concludes animals
to be far from being complete and proper objects of our
passions of gratitude and resentment. 110 A familiar

my own sympathetic feelings with the feelings of the
other. The coincidence of our sentiments is brought
about by my capacity to sympathize with another
through imaginary change of position, conceiving
myself to be in that other's position and comparing
with my own sympathetic feelings the real feelings of
that other. 91
Nor does either Smith or Hume see sympathy as
sentiment. For Hume, the idea of a sentiment is "so
enlivened [through the mechanism of sympathy] as to
become the very sentimem."92 For Smith, sympathy is
merely the correspondence between sentiments of pity,
compassion, or sorroW. 93
Their concepts of sympathy and sentiment fail to
accord with the more usually understood meanings of
the terms, even in their own day. It is therefore difficult
to context within the sentimentalist framework the many
and various judicial references to sympathy94 and
sentiment95 to explain the animal "entity" laws.
Nevertheless, both Hume and Smith discussed
animal sympathy in developing their theories. Since
for Hume good and evil are not simply "matters offact"
but are to be found in one's "own breast," the evil of an
action arises purely because "from the constitution of
your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame
from the contemplation of it."96 Decrying the
rationalists of the European Continent, David Hume
brought the empirical philosophies of Locke and
Berkeley to their logical conclusions. Animal suffering
was self-evident, and its evil lay in the sentiment evoked
from its contemplation. While Hume did not consider
that we are called on to act justly toward animals, he
concluded thal we "should be bound by the laws of
humanity to give gentle usage to these creatures."97
Similarly for Smith animals were not only the causes
of pleasure and pain but also capable of feeling those
sensations. 98 They are, therefore, "less improper objects
of gratitude and resentment than inanimated objects,"99
though still far from being complete and perfect objects
of those passions. For this, they would need to be
capable not only of producing sensations of pleasure
and pain but also of doing so from design.lOo As regards
animals, therefore, Smith concludes that our passions
of gralitude and resentment, while presenl, nevertheless
"still feel that there is something wanting to their entire
gratification."IOJ
Animals are, therefore, for both Hume and Smith,
at least in some sense, proper objects of sentimental
concern. It is in this sense perhaps that the courts have
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rationalize its existence without recourse to the notion
of the intrinsic value of an animal, so contentious in
the "animal rights" debate.
In the historical growth and present form of our
animal "entity" laws, sentiment has been given
significant expression. If the present movement in
reform of Australian welfare law should occur
exclusively in the context of contemporary rationalistic philosophy, this would be to ignore a most
significant aspect of the heritage of our existing law
and its inspiration.

criticism of the sentimentalist account of moral
judgment has been the difficulty of moving from a study
of contingent human desires to posit appropriate
standards of human conduct. ll1 Moral considerations
appear to be left to depend on desires and attitudes to
which each individual mayor may not in fact be subject.
The sentimentalist does seek both a universality and
objectivity in moral judgment. I 12 Hume, for example,
argued that moral sentiments were both natural and
uni versally distributed. 1l3 That they are fixed
psychological characteristics of human nature derives
support from Darwinian evolutionary theory.u 4 The
"all-important emotion of sy mpathy "11 5 is an adaptive
evolutionary feature; a "feeling ... [which] will have
been increased through natural selection; for those
communities, which included the greatest number of
sympathetic members, would flourish best, and rear the
greatest number of offspring."116
Equally difficult to defend is the charge of
anthropomorphism in the expression of our natural
concerns for the welfare of animals. I I? Our sympathy
is stimulated because we assume the animal to be like
ourselves, and in this we fail to recognize the animal's
telos: its own nature. In feeling sympathy for the animal
we are incorrectly projecting our own human
psychology and physiology onto the animal.
While our expanding understanding of the
physiology and psychology of the animal kingdom
increasingly diminishes the strength of this case, it
nevertheless serves to highlight the contention that a
sentimentalist account of moral judgment accords no
intrinsic value to the animal.
The sentimentalist basis for moral judgment
concerning animals appears to be purely instrumental. I I g
Not only does the argument for its contingent nature
apparently remove it from the realm of intrinsic
considerations, its derivation from the anthropomorphic
projection of our own feelings onto animals in the
definition of our sympathies firmly suggests its
foundation in merely instrumental considerations.
Legislation protecting the welfare of animals is merely
a means to our own ends, protecting our own
sensitivities and sensibilities. It is certainly in this sense
that the courts have understood the nature of our
sentimental concern for animals.
The sentimentalist account of the animal "entity"
laws, apparent in the judicial analyses of their
existence, is not only satisfactory for explaining the
form that that law has assumed, it also serves to
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